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Before the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015: 
Juror Punishment in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-
Century England 
Kevin Crosby* 
The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 has created several new offences regarding juror 
misconduct. While this legislation has been passed in response to jurors accessing improper 
‘evidence’ online, it is wrong to treat juror misconduct as a new problem. The most famous 
case on this topic (Bushell’s Case) did not completely prohibit juror punishment, but the 
rhetorical force of the decision was such that penal practices have until recently been 
overlooked in the academic literature. This article argues that assessing the new offences is 
greatly helped by understanding how juror misconduct has been responded to in the past. 
Drawing on the language of Bushell’s Case itself, as well as new archival research, it argues 
that previous practices of juror punishment have largely depended on whether particular 
instances of misconduct related to the juror’s ‘ministerial’ or ‘judicial’ functions; and that 
‘judicial’ offences (those relating to verdict formation) have been much less likely to be 
punished. Rather, such offences have tended to be managed away. If today’s judges continue 
acting in this way, the new offences are unlikely to be resorted to very often, with the judiciary 
being much more likely to focus on techniques for avoiding misconduct in the first place. 
 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law, Newcastle University. I am grateful for the support of the SLS, which funded the archival 
research from which this paper is drawn. I would also like to thank my colleagues Nikki Godden-Rasul and Sylvia 
de Mars, as well as Legal Studies’ two anonymous reviewers, who offered very insightful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
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In recent years, juror misconduct has become an increasingly urgent problem. In 2011, a juror 
was imprisoned for eight months for using Facebook to contact a defendant in a case she was 
trying.1 In January the following year, a second juror was imprisoned for six months, having 
gone online to research a defendant’s previous convictions.2 In 2013, a third juror was 
imprisoned for two months for announcing on Facebook his intent to find a defendant guilty, 
and thereby do harm to a paedophile; a fourth juror was given an identical sentence for taking 
to Google in order to learn about a fraud case being tried by a jury of which he was a part.3 
Five months later the Law Commission, having been asked to expedite its review of contempt 
in light of the 2011 and 2012 instances of juror misconduct, proposed that ‘a discrete offence 
could send an important message to jurors about the seriousness with which such conduct is 
regarded’.4 The government adopted this proposal, including it within the omnibus Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015. This article argues that the new juror misconduct offences – which 
make such misconduct an indictable offence – are unlikely to result in many more convictions. 
Drawing on previously-unexplored archival evidence held at the National Archives, as well as 
newspapers available through the British Newspaper Archive, 5 it argues that while jurors have 
often been punished for offences touching their ‘ministerial’ duties, judges have historically 
been reluctant to proceed against jurors guilty of breaching their duties as ‘judicial’ officers. 
The idea of distinguishing between the ‘ministerial’ and ‘judicial’ aspects of a juror’s duty is 
explored in detail in section one, below. The basic difference between the two parts of the 
juror’s office is that ministerial duties are those, such as attending court when summoned, 
which do not involve the exercise of discretion, while judicial duties are those, principally 
                                                 
1 A-G v Fraill and Sewart [2011] EWHC 1629 (Admin), [2011] 2 Cr App R 21. 
2 A-G v Dallas [2012] EWHC 156 (Admin), [2012] 1 WLR 991. 
3 A-G v Davey; A-G v Beard [2013] EWHC 2317 (Admin), [2014] 1 Cr App R 1. 
4 Law Commission, Contempt of Court: a consultation paper (Law Com No 209, 2012) para 4.38. 
5 See http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/ (accessed 29 May 2015). 
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concerning deliberation, which involve the use of judgment. The archival evidence surveyed 
in this article shows a reluctance to punish jurors guilty of judicial offences, but that 
prosecutions have historically been more likely where the misconduct in question can be 
characterised as ministerial. There is, at one extreme, no evidence of formal punishments for 
jurors simply on account of judicial disagreements with their verdicts, while at the other end 
of the spectrum fines for failing to respond to summonses or for arriving late were 
unexceptional. This, I argue, maps perfectly onto the conceptual ground set out in Bushell’s 
Case in 1670, discussed in detail below. Where jurors have offended in a way which must be 
situated somewhere between the ministerial and the judicial (succumbing to bribes, for 
example), prosecutions have been very unusual, but they have happened. An important general 
conclusion in this article is, therefore, that the more a particular species of jury misconduct has 
tended towards the judicial, the less likely it has been that it will actually result in punishment. 
The new offences are at least partially concerned with the judicial part of the juror’s office and 
are, therefore, likely to be resorted to only very rarely.  
The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 significantly changes the law governing English and 
Welsh juries. The relevant sections of the Act extend the upper limit for jury service to 756 and 
take various steps to tackle the growing problem of jurors accessing improper ‘evidence’ 
online. Sections 69 and 70 give trial judges the power to order jurors to surrender their 
electronic communications devices, and give court security officers the power to search for 
devices subject to such orders.7 Sections 71 to 74 create various indictable offences relating to 
jurors independently researching their cases,8 communicating the product of such research,9 
                                                 
6 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 68. 
7 Ibid, ss 69-70. 
8 Ibid, s 71. 
9 Ibid, s 72. 
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neglecting the juror’s duty to ‘try the issue ... on the basis of the evidence presented in the 
proceedings’,10 or disclosing the basis of their deliberations.11 The fact jurors are now to be 
proceeded against on indictment – the first time English criminal trial jurors will have been 
routinely proceeded against in this way – raises two broad issues. First, does this signal a 
principled shift towards a punitive approach to juror management? Second, is it likely that the 
new offences will actually change the way juror misconduct is managed? This article is 
concerned with the second, more practical of these questions. 
Cheryl Thomas, giving evidence during the Act’s passage through Parliament, argued that ‘if 
people believe that simply by making it a statutory offence that will eliminate any inappropriate 
use of the internet by jurors, they are mistaken’.12 Thomas’ argument was based on her 
extensive research into juror management, including ongoing work with the judiciary aimed at 
finding less intrusive ways of discouraging and policing juror misconduct.13 This article is also 
sceptical about the extent to which the 2015 Act will change judicial responses to juror 
misconduct, and takes as its starting point the claim that exploring previously underutilised 
records at the National Archives regarding juror misconduct will help to shed light on how 
judges historically have responded to this difficult problem. Until very recently, juror 
punishment has not been a particularly pressing issue. This does not mean that judges did not 
have to deal with errant jurors, however, and nor did it mean that government did not have to 
oversee the actions of such judges. Exploring this history helps raise possibilities – not least of 
all the crucial distinction between ministerial and judicial offences – regarding both useful and 
likely approaches to misbehaving jurors, shedding light on an increasingly important debate. 
                                                 
10 Ibid, s 73. 
11 Ibid, s 74. 
12 Criminal Justice and Courts Bill Deb 13 Mar 2014, col 128. 
13 See in particular Cheryl Thomas, ‘Avoiding the Perfect Storm of Juror Contempt’ [2013] Crim LR 483. 
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In 1670, in Bushell’s Case, Vaughan CJ held that jurors could not be punished for acquitting 
in the face of a judicial instruction to convict.14 At a time of severe governmental hostility 
towards religious dissent (particularly regarding those, like the Quakers, whose theology would 
not permit them to swear an oath), a jury refused to convict two Quaker leaders for an unlawful 
religious assembly.15 The jurors were imprisoned for their failure to convict, but were 
eventually able to persuade the Court of Common Pleas to order their release, with Vaughan 
CJ famously holding that their imprisonment had been unlawful. But Juror punishment, it 
should be noted, was only partially prohibited. This fact was easily lost, however, amid the 
energetic debate which followed Vaughan's decision.16 In dialogues like Hawles' in 1680,17 
much was made of the 'qualified impossibility'18 of juror punishment: that judicial browbeating 
might happen, but was legally insignificant. Stern, in particular, has shown how this debate can 
be traced through at least a century of Anglo-American politics.19 But the fact the discussion 
after 1670 shifted towards the legitimacy of jury power has had the consequence of 
downplaying the subsequent history of juror punishment. In fact, Vaughan's judgment did not 
outlaw juror punishment in its entirety; but this fact has generally been overlooked, and as a 
result the history of juror punishment after 1670 has not yet been written. But given recent 
moves in certain common-law countries towards a regularisation of juror punishment,20 this 
history must be taken seriously. This article adds to the debate regarding the propriety and 
                                                 
14 Bushell’s Case (1670) Vaughan 135, 124 ER 1006. In Bushell’s Case, the eponymous juror is consistently 
referred to as ‘Bushel’. For this reason, references to the juror in what follows have a slightly different spelling 
from references to the case. 
15 The Trial of William Penn and William Mead, at the Old Bailey, for a Tumultuous Assembly (1670) 6 Cobbett’s 
State Trials 951. 
16 On the debate generally, see Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: perspectives on the 
criminal trial jury, 1200-1800 (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1985) pp 200-264; and Simon Stern, ‘Between Local 
Knowledge and National Politics: debating rationales for jury nullification after Bushell’s Case’ (2002) 111 Yale 
LJ 1815. 
17 John Hawles, The English-mans Right (London 1680). 
18 Kevin Crosby, ‘Bushell’s Case and the Juror’s Soul’ (2012) 33 JLH 251, 286. 
19 Stern, above n 16. 
20 Law Commission, above n 4, paras 4.36-4.37. 
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practicality of juror punishment by exploring archival evidence of such punishment in England 
and Wales after 1825, when the abolition of the attaint removed the most significant doctrinal 
difference between punishment for civil and for criminal jurors.21 
Such is the significance of Bushell’s Case that very little has been written specifically about 
the legal history of juror punishment. In his 2003 book exploring the eighteenth-century 
development of modern adversarialism, John Langbein stressed the insignificance of Bushell’s 
Case, noting that ‘the judges retained the power to fine jurors for misbehavior’.22 Langbein 
gave as an example a 1680 report from the Old Bailey, where a man was tried for the theft of 
a watch. Both the judge and all but one of the jury thought there was ‘very convincing 
Evidence’ and, when the judge questioned the juror, he explained that ‘he was not satisfied in 
his Conscience; for the watch might be found with the man, and yet he not steal it’. The other 
jurors, however, explained that their dissentient had earlier expressed annoyance with having 
been made to serve, and had declared ‘If I must be on [the jury], I’ll cross, or plague them’. 
The juror denied the charge, but the Court was convinced of his guilt and summarily fined him 
                                                 
21  On the recent debate generally, see ibid, paras 4.36-4.37. Questions of juror misconduct have, in their most 
dramatic forms, been long associated with practices of ‘jury nullification’ or of ‘jury equity’, and this political 
dimension in jury trial has not only been an English story. Nineteenth-century French juries, for example, were 
notorious for acquitting against the evidence, as were Irish juries throughout the nineteenth century and, during 
the second half of the twentieth century in particular, there were similar concerns regarding juries in Northern 
Ireland. But while a comparative discussion exploring the relationship between nullification and punishment in 
these jurisdictions would doubtless be a fruitful way of furthering the current debate regarding juror misconduct 
and punishment, such a discussion would be well beyond the scope of this article. On jury ‘equity’ and 
‘nullifcation’, see generally Green, above n 16, and P Butler, Let’s Get Free: a hip-hop theory of justice (New 
York: The New Press, 2009) pp 57-78. On nineteenth-century French juries, see W Savitt, ‘Villainous Verdicts? 
Rethinking the nineteenth-century French jury’ (1996) 96 Colum L Rev 1019; and JM Donovan, ‘Magistrates and 
Juries in France, 1791-1952’ (1999) 22 French Historical Studies 379. On Irish juries, see N Howlin, ‘The Terror 
of their Lives: Irish jurors experiences’ (2011) 29 LHR 703; D Johnson, ‘Trial by Jury in Ireland 1860-1914’ 
(1996) 17 JLH 270; and J Jackson and S Doran, Judge without Jury: Diplock trials in the adversary system 
(Oxford: OUP, 1995). On the attaint, see below at nn 30-41. 
22 John H Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: OUP, 2003) p 324 n 346. 
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fifty pounds.23 Before the 2015 Act changed the law on juror punishment, most jurors punished 
for misconduct seem to have been dealt with in this summary way.24 
Following the changes in juror punishment brought about by the Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015, such misconduct is no longer to be tried summarily as contempt. Given the publicity 
of the recent trials outlined above, the judiciary, the Law Commission and the government all 
concluded that jurors had to be given the procedural protections of a Crown Court trial before 
they could be fined or imprisoned.25 In some ways, this makes the history of juror punishment 
after 1670 irrelevant: the procedure used to discipline criminal trial jurors for the past three-
and-a-half centuries has now been replaced by a new series of indictable offences. This article 
argues, however, that the growing importance of juror punishment makes it particularly 
important to gain a solid understanding of how such punishment has functioned in the period 
between Bushell’s Case and today. 
This article does not seek to draw a sharp distinction between civil and criminal juries. For 
much of the period under discussion, the primary statute governing qualification for jury 
service was the Juries Act 1825, which did not draw a distinction between the two.26 While the 
nineteenth century saw a steady decline in the use of civil juries, the law in the books generally 
treated the two institutions as broadly equivalent to one another. The major doctrinal difference 
between the punishment of civil and criminal jurors was that the attaint – which, like the new 
provisions under the 2015 Act, subjected jurors suspected of bringing in a false verdict to a 
jury trial – does not seem to have applied to criminal jurors. This article is concerned with the 
                                                 
23 Unnamed defendant, 26 May 1680, OBP, t16800526-1. 
24 See generally David Eady and ATH Smith, Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt (4th edn, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2011) pp 849-854. 
25 Law Commission, Contempt of Court (1): juror misconduct and internet publications (Law Com No 340, 2013) 
particularly para 3.46. 
26 Juries Act 1825, s 1. 
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period after the 1825 abolition of the attaint, however, at which point the law of juror 
punishment applied equally to both types of petit jury. A major difference between the two 
systems regarding alternatives to punishment was the fact that, in a civil case, a verdict deemed 
to be against the evidence could be replaced with a second verdict from a new jury.27 In this 
way the attaint’s corrective role was retained beyond 1825, and so it is possible that some 
judges might have been inclined to treat civil jurors more leniently than their colleagues in the 
criminal courts, whose faulty verdicts could not be so easily corrected. It has not been possible, 
however, to conclusively state on the basis of the surviving evidence whether, and if so to what 
extent, this actually resulted in civil and criminal juries being treated differently. 
The focus here is not on the records kept at local archives throughout England and Wales, but 
rather on those kept at the National Archives in Kew, with support where appropriate from the 
local newspaper reports available via the British Newspaper Archive. The reason for 
proceeding in this way is twofold. First, given the recent move towards a consistent, centralised 
approach to juror misconduct and punishment, it is important to understand how such 
misconduct has previously been addressed and experienced by government. Second, given that 
juror punishment has not traditionally been regarded as a very important problem, many 
records have not survived, and those that have are not bundled together in large files. Given 
the difficulty of pulling together surviving archival evidence, this article primarily focuses on 
centrally-held records. This has enabled the development of a significant new analysis which 
could in future be used as a starting-point for exploring local responses to juror misconduct. 
This analysis shows that the files at the National Archives can best be understood by reading 
them in the context of a conceptual distinction set out in Bushell’s Case itself. This distinction 
                                                 
27 See, eg, WR Cornish, The Jury (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968) pp 117-119. 
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– between “ministerial” and “judicial” functions – originated in England but has subsequently 
been exported to other common-law jurisdictions. It is to this distinction that this article now 
turns. 
1. The terminology of juror punishment: ‘ministerial’ and ‘judicial’ offences 
In this first substantive section, I will set out a framework for understanding the post-1825 
instances of juror punishment which will be explored below. Given that such punishment has 
only recently become a major governmental concern, it is not surprising that the task of 
categorising particular types of punishment or misconduct has not yet been completed. While 
some important juror-related issues, such as the position of women after 1919, have been 
collated at the National Archives into convenient bundles,28 evidence of juror punishment has 
to be collected from individual records which have often been destroyed.29 It is difficult to find 
evidence of juror punishment, and it is equally difficult to find discussions of the concepts 
involved. This may well be a product of Restoration pamphleteers’ success in popularising the 
idea that Bushell’s Case meant jurors were immune to punishment. If so, the best place to look 
for a well thought-out idea of the conceptual bases of juror punishment may well be the period 
in which these pamphleteers were writing, when it was still considered an issue suitable for 
serious political contestation. But first, it will be important to briefly explain what charges an 
errant juror might find herself facing. 
                                                 
28 There are two large bundles on women and jury service held at the National Archives: National Archives HO 
45/13321 (covering the period 1913-1929; originally contained 100 subfiles, of which thirty-three are still extant); 
and National Archives HO 45/24917 (covering the period 1929-1953; originally contained thirty-four subfiles, of 
which twenty-three are still extant). Even here not much has been written: the most substantial account is Anne 
Logan, ‘“Building a New and Better Order”? Women and jury service in England and Wales, c.1920-1970’ (2013) 
22 Women’s History Review 701. 
29 In 1963, the Home Office bundled together several files on juror misconduct into a file internally labelled 
P.130345. This file – referenced in Home Office precedent book, ‘Witnesses, Evidence and Juries’, 1890-1966 
(National Archives: HO 384/16) p 385 – appears to have been subsequently destroyed. It is in response to such 
gaps in the central archives that I have turned to the British Newspaper Archives for supporting information. 
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The first major juror offence was the ‘attaint’, which involved ‘tainting’ the character of jurors 
suspected of delivering a false verdict by subjecting their verdict to a new jury trial.  The attaint 
procedure consisted of a jury of 24 higher-status persons enquiring ‘whether the firste Jurie 
gave true verdict or noo’;30 and those found guilty under this procedure would have their home 
and lands destroyed, as well as being imprisoned.31 Despite Zane’s argument that medieval 
attaint was grounded simply in a claim of inaccuracy (rather than also impugning the jurors’ 
honesty),32 Giles Duncombe, in his 1665 book on jury law,33 explained that the purpose of 
attaint proceedings was ‘to punish all offenders, who would endeavour to ... corrupt the Jury; 
and to punish the juries themselves, if they receive money to give their verdict, or any otherwise 
pre-ingage themselves to any of the parties’.34 By this time, however, punishment for attaint 
was much less severe than it had once been: a succession of sixteenth-century statutes had 
lowered the punishment to perpetual infamy and a fine of either £20 or £5, depending on 
whether the value of the initial suit had been more or less than £40.35 Attaint, in practice, seems 
to have been rarely used after the sixteenth century and, despite an attempt at reviving it through 
legislation in the late-seventeenth century,36 this form of juror punishment was dismissed by 
Lord Mansfield in 1757 as ‘a mere Sound, in every Case’, replaced in practice by the ability of 
                                                 
30 (1531-2) 23 Hen VIII c 3. 
31 This, at any rate, is how Blackstone described the original system: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, vol 3 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1768) p 403. 
32 John M Zane, ‘The Attaint: I’ (1916) 15 Mich L Rev 1, 9-10. Zane does acknowledge that Bracton held this to 
be an important distinction, but concludes that ‘generally speaking, to the men of that age there was in fact little 
difference in incorrect verdicts’. On Bracton’s view, see GE Woodbine and SE Thorne, trans, Bracton on the 
Laws and Customs of England, vol 3 (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1977) pp 336-337. 
33 For a discussion on the authorship of Tryals per Pais, see JC Oldham, ‘The Origins of the Special Jury’ (1983) 
50 U Chi L Rev 137, 144 n 50. 
34 [G Duncombe], Tryals per Pais; or, the law concerning juries by Nisi-Prius, &c. (London, 1665) p 235 (EEBO 
image 109502:130). On the tension between attaint as punishment for an inaccurate verdict and attaint as 
punishment for a wilfully false verdict, see W Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 1 (London: Methuen & 
Co, 7th edn 1956) pp 337-340. 
35 (1495) 11 Hen VII c 24; (1531-2) 23 Hen VIII c 3; (1571) 13 Eliz I c 25. 
36 Holdsworth, above n 34, p342. 
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the courts in civil cases to simply order a new trial.37 When, in 1825, Robert Peel introduced 
the Bill abolishing the attaint, he expressed his hope that ‘[i]n these days … there was a better 
pledge for the integrity of jurors, than any penal statute of this revolting description’.38 In fact, 
an important problem for eighteenth-century English judges had been how, in the wake of 
Bushell’s Case, to find ‘a better pledge for the integrity of jurors’ when it was unlawful to 
punish them for their verdicts.39 In his famous decision of 1670, Vaughan CJ had concluded 
that there was little evidence for the attaint in the context of criminal trials;40 and modern legal 
historians have also struggled to find evidence of criminal attaint.41 After 1670, English judges 
could no longer punish criminal jurors simply for delivering the ‘wrong’ verdict; and after 
1825, this power was also denied to judges sitting in civil courts. 
A second juror offence was ‘embracery’, or the attempt at using threats or rewards to secure a 
favourable jury verdict.42 Historically, this crime was closely connected to the attaint, with one 
fourteenth-century statute for example discussing the punishment for a ‘Jurro ou embraceour 
... atteintz’.43 Several months before he delivered his judgment in Bushell’s Case, Vaughan CJ 
had punished several jurors for being embraced. In 1669, a party to a plea of trespass ‘contrived 
[that two people,] for divers sums of money, should procure themselves to be sworn de 
circumstandibus for the trial of the issue’.44 The jury (including the two bribed talesmen) 
delivered its verdict, and when the scheme was discovered all three men were charged with 
                                                 
37 Bright v Enyon (1757) 1 Burr 390, 393. 
38 HC Deb 9 Mar 1825, vol 12, col 967. Juries Act 1825, s 60. 
39 See generally Langbein, above n 22, pp 318-331, on judicial attempts at controlling jurors after Bushell’s Case. 
40 Bushell’s Case, above n 14, 1011. 
41 See James Q Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: theological roots of the criminal trial (Yale UP 2008) 
pp 154-156, and the sources referred to therein. 
42 On embracery generally, see Seymour D Thompson, ‘Tampering with the Jury’ (1881) 13 Cent LJ 242. 
43 (1363-4) 38 Edw III c 12. 
44 R v Opie, Dodge and Others (1669) 1 WMS Saunders 301, 85 ER 419, p 419. The fact the men were sworn ‘de 
circumstandibus’ refers to the practice of swearing ‘talesmen’ – other qualified people found in the vicinity of the 
court – when an insufficient number of the jurors originally summoned have actually attended court. This power 
is currently contained in Juries Act 1974, s 6. 
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embracery.45 They were convicted by Vaughan, and Hale CJ refused on appeal to countenance 
their objections. The reporter noted that ‘although there was no matter of law determined in 
this case ... I have taken notice of it for the enormity of the offence in such bad practices to 
corrupt the very fountain of justice, which are worthy of severe punishment.’46 Peel’s 1825 
Juries Act explicitly preserved the crime of embracery,47 but it nonetheless seems to have been 
considered an extraordinary offence. When James Baker was tried for embracery in 1891, for 
example, his trial broke down owing to uncertainty about the form such a prosecution should 
take;48 and when Norman Owen was convicted of the offence in 1975, the Court of Appeal 
complained that a simple charge of contempt would have sufficed.49 This informal desuetude 
was formalised when, in 2010, the Bribery Act abolished the offence.50 
The third major juror offence is contempt of court. There is evidence of English courts 
exercising contempt jurisdiction from the thirteenth century, with Bracton noting there is ‘no 
greater crime than Contempt and Disobedience, for all persons within the Realm ought to be 
obedient to the King and within his peace’.51 While many contemners were certainly tried by 
jury up to at least the fourteenth century,52 by the eighteenth century the ordinary procedure 
                                                 
45 A 1652 practice book reports the standard fee for a civil juror to be eight shillings, with the fee for a talesman 
set at four shillings: Anon, The Practick Part of the Law: shewing the office of a compleat attorney (London 1652) 
p 33 (EEBO image 172378:19). On juror payment prior to the formal establishment of special juries (who were 
paid a higher rate) in 1730, see Oldham, above n 33, 144-148 and Howlin, above n 21, 748-752. Payment of jurors 
in civil cases was the responsibility of the parties, and criminal jurors were not entitled to payment, until the Juries 
Act 1949 made payment for all jurors the responsibility of the state: see HC Deb 8 Apr 1875, vol 223, col 494. 
The issue in Opie, Dodge and Others was not that the jurors were paid by the parties, but rather that they were 
bribed to attend court, in order that they might be summoned as talesmen and therefore be in a position to deliver 
a verdict favourable to the defendant. 
46 Opie, Dodge and Others, above n 44, p 420. 
47 Juries Act 1825, s 61. 
48 James Baker, 9 Mar 1891, OBP, t18910309-302. See also ‘Alleged Attempt to Influence a Jury’ Bury and 
Norwich Post (20 Jan 1891), where Baker is erroneously referred to as James Parker. 
49 R v Owen [1976] 1 WLR 840, p 841 (per Lawton LJ). 
50 Bribery Act 2010, s 17(1). 
51 Quoted from in Eady and Smith, above n 24, p 1. 
52 Ibid, p 7. 
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was the summary one known to us today.53 With the decline and then abolition of the attaint 
and of embracery, contempt has come to be seen until very recently as the most natural way of 
punishing errant jurors. While jurors cannot be punished simply for delivering the wrong 
verdict, Arlidge, Eady and Smith explain that it would be contempt for a juror to refuse to 
participate in the verdict; to wilfully misrepresent the other jurors’ decision when acting as a 
foreman; to convict against a direction to acquit; to reach a verdict by flipping a coin, etc.; to 
discuss the verdict or deliberations with non-jurors; or to separate from the other jurors during 
deliberations without the judge’s consent.54 Contempt covers a wide range of juror misconduct. 
Having very briefly surveyed the three main types of juror punishment, it is clear that contempt 
is by far the most significant in principle, and that after Owen it is the only plausible option for 
disciplining jurors who fail to behave appropriately. But examining evidence of juror 
punishment through a purely doctrinal lens would shed little light on the practices under 
discussion. Employing the framework suggested by Vaughan CJ in Bushell’s Case is far more 
illuminating, for two reasons. First, simply identifying examples of contempt (or embracery) 
would be unduly restrictive, as it would mean overlooking those cases where misconduct was 
identified but was not acted upon in a formal way. Second, as we have already seen above, the 
judiciary, the Law Commission and the government have all expressed their desire to get away 
from the tradition of using contempt to punish errant jurors, as they are concerned that summary 
proceedings lack adequate due process guarantees. Therefore any useful analysis of juror 
punishment must now be able to look past the doctrinal constraints of traditional contempt 
                                                 
53 Ibid, pp 17-19. For a discussion of the desuetude of contempt as an indictable offence, see Dallas, above n 2, 
992-994. 
54 Eady and Smith, above n 24, pp 850-854. 
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proceedings. But if counting instances of contempt, embracery, etc. is insufficient, what other 
means might be used to analyse archival evidence of responses to juror misconduct? 
In his 1670 judgment against juror punishment, Vaughan distinguished the (discretionary) 
‘judicial’ task of reaching a verdict, ‘for which [jurors] are not fineable, nor to be punisht, but 
by attaint’,55 from the juror’s various (non-discretionary) ‘ministerial’ functions, breach of 
which could be punished: 
‘Much of the office of jurors, in order to their verdict, is ministerial, as not withdrawing 
from their fellows, after they are sworn, not withdrawing after challenge, and being 
tryed in before they take their oath; not receiving from either side evidence after their 
oath not given in Court, not eating and drinking before their verdict, refusing to give a 
verdict, and the like; wherein if they transgress, they are fineable’.56 
This ministerial-judicial distinction was in use in England by the end of the sixteenth century,57 
and is still used in some American administrative law today.58 Vaughan’s use of the distinction 
was unusual in acting as a criterion for determining the legitimacy of juror punishment; but it 
was not expanded upon beyond the passage quoted above. Understanding this distinction is 
essential, however, both for understanding Vaughan’s judgment and for situating the 2015 
reforms in a critical, historical context, one which will raise serious doubts about their 
practicality. 
                                                 
55 Bushell’s Case, above n 14, 1014. It should be noted that Vaughan’s list here is very similar to Duncombe’s 
penultimate chapter on juror misconduct: Duncombe, above n 34, pp 210-223. 
56 Ibid, p 1014. 
57 See below, nn 59-66. 
58 See, eg, Rozalynne Thompson, ‘Somewhere in Between: the classification and standard of review of mixed 
ministerial-discretionary land use decisions’ (2009) 15 Hastings W-Nw J Envt’l L & Pol’y 325; and for an 
overview of the early twentieth-century jurisprudence, see Edwin W Patterson, ‘Ministerial and Discretionary 
Official Acts’ (1921-1922) 20 Mich L Rev 848. 
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Ministerial officials were understood to lack discretion. Nonetheless, they did occasionally 
have greater freedom of action than those acting judicially, as in Mackalley’s case, where a 
Sunday arrest (arrest being a ministerial activity) was deemed lawful, even though Sundays 
were not dies juridicus.59 The fact judicial activities were impermissible on the Sabbath did not 
preclude ministerial tasks relating to a criminal trial, for example, from being carried out. In 
one case, the judges of King’s Bench were asked to consider the legality of a proceeding which 
would reduce a judge to a mere minister of the City of London, applying a certificate from the 
mayor and aldermen regarding customary duties at the city’s docks and wharves rather than 
submitting the question to a jury trial. The mayor and aldermen claimed to have statutory 
authorisation for the procedure; but the judges were keen to circumvent it, noting that even if 
‘the custom of certificate … is confirmed by Parliament … even an Act of Parliament, made 
against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in it self’.60 Ministerial 
actions are automatic processes, and as such lack the due process guarantees of judicial 
determinations. 
Vaughan’s position was not that a juror was a judicial officer and therefore immune to 
punishment; rather, jurors were immune to punishment only when they were acting in their 
judicial capacity. And the jury was not alone in being assigned this split office. The auditors of 
the Court of Wards, for example, had the ministerial task of auditing accounts as well as a 
judicial ‘voice in every cause depending in the … Court’.61 Another group who regularly 
appeared in the seventeenth-century cases as holders of a partially judicial, partially ministerial 
                                                 
59 Mackalley’s Case (1611) 9 Co Rep 65b, 77 ER 828, 831. 
60 Day v Savadge (1614) Hobart 85, 80 ER 235, 237. 
61 Auditor Curle’s Case (1609) 11 Co Rep 2b, 77 ER 1147, 1147. Coke’s report of this case repeatedly makes the 
distinction between a ministerial ‘office’ and a judicial ‘voice’ (although Coke does also refer to a ‘judicial office’ 
on several occasions). In Day v Savadge, the court noted that the certification procedure would make ‘the recorder 
… but their [ie the mayor and aldermen’s] mouth to speak for them, as they command him’. Day v Savadge, above 
n 60, 237. 
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office, were sheriffs. ‘[A]nd some times [a sheriff] exercises both together, as in redisseisin, 
for of that he is Judge, and also is minister to the Court of the King, and yet he is but one 
man’.62 But what these cases emphasise is the impermissibility of delegating a judicial, as 
opposed to a ministerial function: a sheriff may appoint an undersheriff to execute his 
ministerial functions, but nonetheless ‘the law doth not take any notice of [an] undersheriff’,63 
meaning that the sheriff must accept responsibility for exercises of his judicial discretion. And 
this meant, by Vaughan’s analogy, that jurors must not be punished for their strictly judicial 
actions. 
The perceived importance of respecting the decisions of people acting judicially is further 
demonstrated in the attempt by Bushel and his co-jurors to seek legal redress against the judges 
who had had them imprisoned. Their case failed because of the need to protect judicial officers 
(in this case judges) from being punished for their decisions, even if their decisions had been 
found to be incorrect.64 The fullest report explained that ‘[t]hough the defendants [ie the judges] 
here acted erroneously ... the contrary opinion carried great colour with [them] … so that 
though they were mistaken, yet they acted judicially, and for that reason no action will lie 
against the defendant.’65 But none of this means, of course, that jurors were immune to 
punishment: only that they could not be punished in their judicial capacity. So it was that when 
a juror was fined in 1680 he was punished in his ministerial capacity, having declared he would 
‘plague them’ with obstructions if he was forced to serve. ‘For though Jury-men … are not by 
                                                 
62 Bryan Chamberlain’s v Goldsmith (1609) 2 Brownl 280, 123 ER 942, 943. 
63 Ibid, p 943. See also Phelps v Winchcombe (1615) 3 Bulst 77, 81 ER 66; Norton v Sims (1623) 1 Brownl 63, 
123 ER 667; and Leonard’s Case (1623) Godb 355, 78 ER 209. 
64 Bushel v Starling (1673) 3 Kebl 322, 84 ER 774; Bushel v Howel (1673) 3 Kebl 359, 84 ER 765; Bushell’s Case 
(1674) 1 Mod 119, 86 ER 777; Hamond v Howell (1674) 1 Mod 184, 86 ER 816; Hamond v Howell, Recorder of 
London (1677) 2 Mod 218, 86 ER 1035. 
65 Hamond v Howell, Recorder of London (1677) 2 Mod 218, 86 ER 1035, 1037. 
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Law to be punished … for giving Verdicts according to there Consciences, yet it seems both 
just and necessary that such misdemeanours of resolved stubbornness be restrained.’66 
Further evidence for a ministerial-judicial concept in juror punishment comes from Nelson’s 
work on colonial American law. One early Pennsylvania jury, Nelson reports, had decided to 
resolve a deadlock situation by drawing lots; and they and the constable were fined £50 for 
their impropriety.67 But given Bushell’s Case arose from a judge-jury dispute in the trial of 
Penn and Mead, it is important to establish why juror punishment was acceptable in Penn’s 
colony. Nelson argues Pennsylvania’s Quaker elite simply decided ‘to resolve the conflict 
between judicial authority and the power of local communities represented on juries’68 by 
empowering equitable courts to ‘“mitigate, alter, or reverse” jury verdicts’.69 While this 
argument accounts for the general disempowerment of juries in Penn’s Pennsylvania, it does 
not explain how the ruling elite concluded that juror punishment was acceptable despite 
Bushell’s Case. This problem is easily explicable, however, when cast in terms of Vaughan’s 
ministerial-judicial dichotomy. Jurors casting lots were not acting ‘judicially’: the jurors in this 
case had designed an ad hoc procedure which stood in for the ‘judicial’ power which Vaughan’s 
prohibition of juror punishment was premised upon. They were, therefore, punished for the 
ministerial offence of refusing to exercise their judicial power. 
                                                 
66 Unnamed defendant, above n 23. 
67 William E Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America, vol 2: The Middle Colonies and the Carolinas, 1660-
1730 (Oxford: OUP, 2013) p 109. While Nelson made the point in the first volume of his projected four-volume 
study of colonial American law that the common law of England was never simply transplanted into North 
America – William E Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America, vol 1: The Chesapeake and New England, 
1607-1660 (Oxford: OUP, 2008) – volume two explores those colonies founded after the Restoration, which were 
generally expected to stick reasonably close to the common law of England. This, combined with Penn’s personal 
involvement in Bushell’s Case, makes a brief consideration of Pennsylvanian jury practice justifiable. 
68 Nelson (2013), above n 67, p 109. 
69 Ibid, p 109. See also the French moves towards ‘correctionalization’ and ‘échevinage’ in France a century later, 
discussed in Donovan, above n 21. 
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Modern practices of juror punishment, then, should not simply be classified in doctrinal terms. 
Given that until 2015 most juror misconduct could be characterised as contempt, and given the 
government’s desire to eradicate contempt as the ordinary mechanism for punishing jurors who 
have, for example, used Facebook to contact a defendant, any analysis which centres on the 
purely doctrinal question of the offence which misbehaving jurors historically faced will be 
particularly unhelpful today. An analysis which considers juror misconduct in terms of the 
juror’s split function – half-ministerial, half-judicial – is a more promising way of 
understanding the recent history of juror punishment, as this classification reaches past the 
boundaries of doctrinal history. In what follows, I will look at three categories of juror offence: 
judicial, ministerial and quasi-ministerial. First, I will explore the limited evidence of judicial 
offences in nineteenth- and twentieth-century England. Given that the whole point of Bushell’s 
Case was to protect jurors acting in their judicial capacity, it is unsurprising that the evidence 
here is sparse. But as the 2015 Act transforms quasi-judicial problems into offences cast in 
ministerial terms, it will be important to understand how this kind of transformation has been 
achieved in the past. 
2. ‘Judicial’ offences 
In the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cases concerning the ‘ministerial’ and ‘judicial’ 
functions of various administrative officers, ‘judicial’ functions were those which concerned 
the use of discretion. In Bushell’s Case, Vaughan CJ was very clear what he counted as a 
‘judicial’ part of the juror’s office: ‘the verdict it self, when given, is not an act ministerial, but 
judicial’.70 While it is clear that verdicts, and therefore deliberations, form part of the juror’s 
judicial function, the surviving archival records require matters concerning verdicts to be 
                                                 
70 Bushell’s Case, above n 14, 1014. 
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evaluated in two stages. First, may jurors delivering a ‘wrong’ verdict be punished simply 
because the judge disagreed with the outcome? Bushell’s Case is unequivocal that they cannot, 
and broadly speaking this seems to have been the practice of the courts. Second, may fresh 
information be used in order to challenge the jurors’ bona fides, demonstrating that they were 
in breach of their judicial duties? Bushell’s Case is less clear on this point, and in fact judges 
seem always during the period under discussion to have been uncomfortable with reopening 
the conclusions of a jury acting judicially. The solution to this problem was, as we shall see, to 
make the disclosure of deliberations a ministerial offence. 
In September 1917, two youths aged sixteen were tried for arson. At the pre-trial hearing at the 
Middlesex Sessions, both boys had confessed;71 but in their trial at Westminster Guildhall they 
entered pleas of ‘not guilty’.72 The jurors returned verdicts of ‘not guilty’ for both defendants, 
and were severely rebuked by Montagu Sharpe, the Chairman of the Assizes: ‘All I can say, 
gentlemen of the Jury, is that you have been absolutely regardless of your oath. These men 
have pleaded guilty, and the evidence is of the clearest possible nature. You are none of you fit 
to sit on a Jury, but you will remain here until the end of the Sessions.’73 The foreman, George 
Lathan, objected to being ‘subjected to any such observations’,74 but Sharpe continued: ‘I will 
report you to the Home Office, because the evidence is so clear that you have absolutely, in my 
                                                 
71 Examination of Frederick Charles Parker and Sidney Thompson, Court House Tottenham and Court House 
Wood Green, 26 Jul and 3 Aug 1917 (National Archives: HO 45/10886/348754/3) pp 4-6. It should be noted that 
their confessions relate to a fire which they admitted causing accidentally. A Home Office minute suggested that 
this may help to explain the jury’s verdict: ‘It is possible that the jury not being properly versed in the common 
law doctrine of ‘malice’ may have come to the conclusion that though the lads set fire to the pavilion, they did not 
do so ‘maliciously’, or they may have thought that apparently it is still law that ‘malice’ cannot be presumed but 
must be proved affirmatively in the case of offender under 14, that benefit may be extended to youthful offenders 
over 14.’ Note signed ‘HBS’ [I assume that this is HB Simpson: Jill Pellew, The Home Office 1848-1914: from 
clerks to bureaucrats (London: Heinemann, 1982) p 211], 3 Oct 1917 (National Archives: HO 
45/10886/348754/3). 
72 Transcript of the trial of R v Parker and Thompson, Westminster Guildhall, 22 Sep 1917 (National Archives: 
HO 45/10886/348754/3) p 18. 
73 Ibid, p 18. 
74 Ibid, p 19. 
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opinion, gone against your oaths. Go away.’75 Lathan, a trade union leader,76 sent Sharpe a 
letter demanding the jurors’ release,77 and contacted the press and the Home Office about the 
situation.78 Lathan argued that either the judge had been wrong to describe the jurors as unfit, 
meaning they should receive an apology and be used for future trials, or the jurors really were 
unfit, and were therefore being required to attend court despite lacking the qualifications to 
serve (meaning they could face criminal sanctions for failing to attend, despite knowing their 
attendance would be completely futile). As he put it in the statement of facts he sent to the 
Home Office, ‘the Chairman of the Sessions had committed a grave abuse of the power his 
position gives him in censuring the Jury in respect of their verdict, and ... they have been 
illegally detained in accordance with his threat’.79 Lathan, in short, saw his predicament as a 
form of imprisonment. But while the Home Office seems to have been sympathetic to Lathan’s 
predicament, it nonetheless took almost a month for the situation to be resolved. 
The file regarding Lathan’s complaint shows the government was unsure what it could do to 
help. The Lord Chancellor’s Office noted that even ‘[a]ssuming, as I think we may, that 
                                                 
75 Ibid, p 19. 
76 Lathan was Chief Assistant Secretary of the Railway Clerks Association. 
77 Letter from George Lathan to Montagu Sharpe, 25 Sep 1917 (National Archives: HO 45/10886/348754). 
78 For press coverage of the Sharpe-Lathan dispute, see ‘Jury “Kept In”: punished because they found two youths 
“not guilty”’ Sunday Mirror (23 Sep 1917); ‘Angry Court Scene: magistrate to report jury to Home Secretary’ 
Evening Despatch (24 Sep 1917); ‘Court Scene: jurors to be reported to Home Secretary’ Liverpool Daily Post 
(24 Sep 1917); ‘Magistrate and Jury: a shameful miscarriage of justice’ Birmingham Daily Post (24 Sep 1917); 
‘A Jury Rebuked: “most shameful miscarriage of justice”’ Western Daily Times (25 Sep 1917); ‘“Miscarriage of 
Justice”: sessions chairman and a jury’s verdict’ Western Mail (25 Sep 1917); ‘The Obdurate Jury: chairman 
refuses to hear explanation’ Aberdeen Evening Express (25 Sep 1917); ‘“The Obdurate Jury”: Mr Sharpe’s reply 
to foreman’s letter’ Aberdeen Evening Press (26 Sep 1917); ‘Obdurate Jury: sessions chairman climbs down’ 
Evening Despatch (26 Sep 1917); ‘“In the Public Interest”: sessions chairman and jury’ Sunderland Daily Echo 
and Shipping Gazette (26 Sep 1917); ‘Obdurate Jury: sessions chairman climbs down’ Birmingham Gazette 26 
Sep 1917; ‘Censured Jury: all but four allowed to go’ Liverpool Daily Post (27 Sep 1917); ‘Jury Rebuked at 
Sessions’ Middlesex Chronicle (29 Sep 1917); ‘A Jury’s Grievance’ Manchester Evening News (8 Oct 1917); 
‘The Aggrieved Jury: discharged, but talk of taking fresh action’ Aberdeen Evening News (9 Oct 1917); 
‘“Penalised Jury” Discharged’ Birmingham Daily Mail (9 Oct 1917). While none of these reports add anything 
beyond the information gathered together in the exhaustive Home Office file, the extent of press reporting of 
Sharpe’s jury suggests this was widely understood to be a serious – and unusual – matter. 
79 ‘Attempted Intimidation of a Jury, Middlesex Sessions, September, 1917’, 2 Oct 1917 (National Archives: HO 
45/10886/348754/4) 6. 
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Sharpe’s conduct was ill judged and arbitrary, he did not, so far as I can see, do any act which 
would justify the Lord Chancellor in removing him from the Bench’.80 When Sharpe threatened 
the jurors that they would be called for service in the October sessions (but without removing 
the bar on their actually serving), the Home Office were unable to do anything other than write 
a strongly-worded letter advising the judge against this action, noting that doing so would only 
confirm the perception that his actions ‘would be impossible for the Secretary of State to defend 
as constitutional or right’.81 Four days earlier, when Lathan had visited the Home Office ‘in an 
extremely distraught frame of mind’,82 one official ‘promised him that if he and the other jurors 
were sent to prison for refusing to serve I personally would do my best to get them out’; but 
the hand-written note continued, somewhat less optimistically, to observe that ‘this would be 
worth very little and I was not sure that S of S had power to release them!’83 
The punishment of Lathan and his co-jurors is as close as the  surviving governmental records 
come to a clear example of a jury being punished for a verdict according to conscience. The 
size of the file, at almost one hundred pages, suggests the Home Office were not used to dealing 
with such cases, and it is doubtful that any other instances of the quasi-imprisonment of a juror 
would not have been scrutinised by government. But while Sharpe’s actions were considered 
unconstitutional by the Home Office, there are some references in the file to a perception that 
judges frequently held unsatisfactory jurors in the state of quasi-imprisonment in which the 
jurors here found themselves.84 This raises the possibility that juror punishment was still a 
                                                 
80 Letter from Claud Schuster to Edward Troup, 17 Oct 1917 (National Archives: HO 45/10886/348754) p 1. 
81 Letter to Montagu Sharpe, 6 Oct 1917 (National Archives: HO 45/10886/348754). See also Sir Edward Troup’s 
general comments on the limited role of the Home Office with regard to ongoing court proceedings: Edward 
Troup, The Home Office (2nd edn, London: GP Putnam’s Sons, 1926) p 73. 
82 Note signed ‘HBS’, 4 Oct 1917 (National Archives: HO 45/10886/348754/3). 
83 Ibid. 
84 See, eg, note signed ‘HBS’, 1 Oct 1917 (National Archives: HO 45/10886/348754/2). 
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reasonably regular occurrence in the early twentieth century, but that it was managed in such a 
way as would keep it off the books and, therefore, out of the archives. 
Local newspapers occasionally reported informal punishments similar to that suffered by 
Lathan. In 1929, for example, Horridge J sternly rebuked two female jurors for returning late 
from lunch. He refused to allow them to return to the jury box, adding however that ‘they must 
attend in court every day for the rest of the week’.85 But while this punishment was the same 
as that prescribed by Sharpe a decade earlier, here it was meted out for a ministerial failure to 
attend on time rather than for a judicial failure to reach the correct verdict. A more obviously 
judicial punishment came in 1870, when the foreman of a Norwich County Court jury was 
briefly imprisoned for challenging the trial judge’s right to issue binding directions of law. But 
while the punishment here was certainly more dramatic, it is still not quite right to characterise 
this as a juror being punished for delivering the wrong verdict: rather, the issue seems to have 
been the direct challenge to the judge’s authority. There are also several examples in local 
newspapers of jurors being discharged on account of their verdicts,86 and of judges instructing 
local officials to summon better jurors next time.87 But this all hints at a judicial preference for 
managing the composition of a jury panel over more drastic responses to perceived 
impropriety. So it was, for example, that in 1928 Montagu Sharpe, once again dissatisfied with 
a jury’s verdict, complained that it was not possible for him to actually punish his jurors: ‘I 
don’t think you have done your duty ... I am ashamed of you. I can only regret your decision. 
                                                 
85 ‘Women Jurors: Reproved for late return from lunch’ Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer (5 Jun 1929). 
86 ‘A Jury Rebuked’ Gloucester Citizen (30 Jul 1878); ‘An Intelligent Jury and their Verdict’ Lancaster Gazette 
(14 Jan 1880); ‘Independent Jurors and Petulant Judges’ Reynold’s Newspaper (19 Feb 1882); ‘A Judicial Rebuke’ 
Nottingham Evening Post (21 Oct 1892); and ‘Judge’s Sharp Words to Somerset Jury’ Western Daily Press (22 
Oct 1932). 
87 ‘Assize Intelligence: Welsh juries’ Oxford Journal (13 Aug 1864); ‘Town and County News: Chief Justice 
Erle’s rebuke to a stupid jury’ Cambridge Independent Press (13 Aug 1864). 
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I cannot do anything.’88 Despite the Home Office’s impression that Sharpe’s treatment of 
Lathan was not unique in the history of judge-jury relations, it is difficult to find other clear-
cut examples. 
While the Contempt of Court Act 1981 ultimately limited the extent to which newspapers could 
explore the basis of a verdict,89 it seems to have been common for nineteenth-century 
newspapers to criticise jurors for the discharge of their judicial function. For one 1862 juror, 
the resulting damage to his reputation was so great that he asked a local newspaper to publish 
a letter explaining his jury’s deliberative processes.90 Judges too were occasionally criticised 
for expressing displeasure at a jury’s verdict,91 although censure from the Bench seems to have 
generally been considered more legitimate than denunciations from the press. When, in 1875, 
Benjamin Disraeli refused to introduce legislation prohibiting such reprimands from the 
judiciary,92 several newspapers published editorials praising the practice as ‘preferable to the 
gibbeting’ certain jurors have received ‘week after week’ in the press,93 as well as being a 
practice likely to give ‘encouragement to the witnesses’ and ‘stimulat[e] other juries to do their 
duty’.94 So while it was not acceptable for judges to actually punish their jurors for judicial 
offences, a stern rebuke was seen as a way of giving voice to legitimate concerns without 
                                                 
88 ‘Jury Rebuked’ Western Daily Press (10 Jan 1928) 12. 
89 Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 8. 
90 ‘A Jury on their Defence’ Worcestershire Chronicle (21 May 1862). 
91 ‘Miscellaneous: Insulting Treatment of a Jury’ Worcestershire Chronicle (17 Jan 1849); ‘A Sessions Chairman 
and a Sessions Jury’ Bell’s Life in London and Sporting Chronicle (7 Jan 1849). 
92 HC Deb 8 Apr 1875, vol 223, col 494. 
93 Unititled editorial Staffordshire Sentinel (24 Mar 1875) 2. For a similar argument, see Atkin LJ in Ellis v Deheer 
[1922] 2 KB 113, 121. 
94 ‘Judges and Juries’ Western Daily Press (17 Apr 1875) 7. But see ‘Working Men on Juries’ Reynold’s 
Newspaper (3 Nov 1878) for an argument that censure from the Bench undermines the jury’s judicial function. 
Donovan has argued that the high acquittal rates of nineteenth-century French juries can, conversely, be partially 
attributed to the perceived partiality of judicial interrogatoires: Donovan, above n 22, 386. 
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exposing any particular set of jurors to the long-term ignominy of denunciations in print, which 
would only cease at the whim of the press.95 
It is not, then, altogether clear that jurors were very frequently punished for judicial offences 
(except to the extent that the partial disenfranchisement of persons deemed unsuitable for 
further service can be considered a punishment); although it was clearly common for judges to 
deliver their jurors a stern rebuke. Another possibility was that the jurors themselves might 
inadvertently bring their verdicts into disrepute, particularly by calling either for leniency or 
for a pardon.96 Sometimes jurors were pressured into doing so by people connected to the 
defendant.97 Particularly heavy pressure was exerted on the jury in a robbery case in 1827, 
where the defendants, convicted of a felony, potentially faced execution. The foreman of the 
jury, Joseph Dofsell, was visited by a friend of the prisoners, and asked to sign a petition stating 
the verdict was delivered against the evidence. When Dofsell refused, his visitor started 
shouting, and was therefore asked to leave. Dofsell was later called to a local pub for a meeting 
of the jurors, where the prisoners’ friend induced the whole jury (including Dofsell) to sign. 
When this case came before the Attorney and Solicitor General, they concluded that nothing 
could be done to prevent this sort of thing from happening: it was ‘reprehensible yet as no 
personal violence was used and no such threats employed as would amount to intimidation … 
                                                 
95 Such rebukes also served to make clear that the problem was this particular juror or jury, rather than the jury 
system as a whole. There were also at this time, however, attacks on the civil jury system as a whole: C Hanly, 
‘The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England’ (2005) 26 JLH 253. See also the nineteenth-
century French judicial attacks on the jury system Savitt, above n 22, 1029-1030. Although Savitt also notes that, 
despite judicial attacks on the lenience of French juries, it seems that the judiciary was no less lenient in practice: 
ibid, 1056-1060. 
96 The sheer volume of such records on file at the National Archives suggest that such petitions were still a 
reasonably common part of the criminal process. Sir Edward Troup, Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the 
Home Office during the second decade of the twentieth century, wrote shortly after his retirement in 1922 that 
‘Great weight is always given by the Home Secretary to a recommendation by a jury if some sufficient reason be 
given for it.’ Troup, above n 96, p 68. 
97 This was not, of course, simply an English phenomenon: see, e.g., Donovan, above n 21, 380-381. 
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we cannot … recommend a prosecution’.98 Interference with a jury after a verdict was returned 
was not easily prevented, perhaps in part because by this stage the ‘jurors’ had formally left 
their temporary judicial offices.99 
It is well known that the appellate courts of England and Wales have periodically struggled 
with the question of when they should be permitted to take judicial notice of evidence regarding 
a jury’s deliberations. In 1922, the Court of Appeal admitted evidence from a juror who claimed 
to have been unable to hear the foreman’s verdict when it was delivered, and that if he had 
heard it being delivered he would not have given his assent. The Court, however, made it clear 
that it would not be willing to hear evidence of what had actually been discussed during the 
jury’s deliberations.100 Seven decades later, the Court only permitted itself to take notice of a 
jury’s use of a Ouija board because the board had not technically been used during 
deliberations.101 In 2004, the House of Lords held that the secrecy of deliberations was an 
important part of the jury system, and that all judicial tribunals should be presumed to be 
impartial: if allegations were going to be made by jurors about their colleagues, they must be 
made before the verdict is in.102 As the following discussion will show, this strict prohibition 
on revealing the basis of a jury’s deliberations (explicitly made a contempt in 1981 and 
converted into an indictable offence by the 2015 Act) was prompted by the increasing 
frequency during the twentieth century of attempts to undermine a jury’s verdict by providing 
information about its deliberations. Rather than accepting evidence suggesting jurors may have 
                                                 
98 Opinion of Charles Wetherell and Nicholas Conyngham Tindal, Lincoln’s Inn, 12 Apr 1827, in ‘Opinion Book’ 
(National Archives: TS 25/2040/48) p 302. 
99 See also Howlin, above n 21, 752-754. 
100 Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113. See also R v Wooler (1817) 2 Starkie 111, (1817) 171 ER 589. This kind of 
disclosure still occasionally occurs: R v Vanegas [2014] EWCA Crim 2911. 
101 R v Young [1995] QB 324 (CA). 
102 R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 1 AC 1118. See, eg, R v OKZ [2010] EWCA Crim 2272. 
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committed judicial offences, non-disclosure of deliberations was eventually made one of the 
ministerial (ie non-discretionary) parts of a juror’s duty. 
In 1911, the doctor Sidney Lightfoot was convicted for carrying out an abortion. Lightfoot had 
argued at his trial that the abortion was simply the unfortunate byproduct of a medically 
necessary procedure;103 and when a guilty verdict was returned the trial judge expressed his 
disappointment.104 Lightfoot’s wife, Lillie, contacted two jurors who had signed a petition of 
mercy regarding her husband;105 and these jurors claimed several others had voted ‘guilty’ 
simply to avoid missing the last train home.106 She then requested that the Home Office look 
into the alleged juror misconduct. The Home Office asked the Court of Criminal Appeal for 
guidance, noting that the Home Secretary ‘would desire to use every possible means of 
discouraging’ the ‘objectionable and dangerous … practice’107 of interviewing jurors regarding 
their verdicts; and Lord Alverstone replied that the Court would continue its practice of 
‘declin[ing] to receive’108 such statements. Despite at least one juror having confessed before 
a magistrate to putting his convenience before his oath, there was no suggestion that any of the 
jurors should be punished for misconduct: Lord Alverstone, for one, was convinced of 
                                                 
103 ‘Dr Lightfoot Found Guilty’, 14 Feb 1911, Watford Leader – West Herts News (National Archives: HO 
144/1122/204340/3). 
104 Ibid. 
105 See generally divider 29 of the Lightfoot file (National Archives: HO 144/1122/204340/29). The petition was 
signed by over 36,000 people (National Archives: HO 144/1122/204340/14). 
106 ‘Mrs Lightfoot’s report on her first visit to Mr Harry Cox’, received 21 Nov 1911 (National Archives: HO 
144/1122/204340/29); ‘Questions sent to Mr Harry Cox by Mrs Lightfoot and his replies thereto’, received 21 
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(National Archives: HO 144/1122/204340/37). 
107 Letter from Edward Troup to the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 Nov 1911 (National Archives: 
HO 144/1122/204340/31). 
108 Letter from Lord Alverstone, 5 Dec 1911 (National Archives: HO 144/1122/204340/31). 
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Lightfoot’s guilt,109 so felt the conviction should not be interfered with (including by interfering 
with the former jurors). 
A Home Office precedent book suggests a possible change during the twentieth century 
regarding the desirability of governmental intervention in these circumstances. In 1924, a 
‘Judge asked HO to administer a rebuke’ to a juror who expressed sympathy to the organiser 
of a petition of mercy; but ‘HO did not consider it objectionable’, as the juror had not expressed 
doubts about the verdict itself.110 In 1928, when jurors commented on a case ‘between giving 
of verdict and execution of sentence’, it was felt that this was ‘Improper, but practice very rare 
and introduction of legislation therefore not necessary’.111 In 1949, following a murder trial, 
one juror wrote to defence counsel expressing doubts about the jury’s guilty verdict. ‘It turned 
out that the juryman [sic] in question was a very kindly and respectable old lady and no action 
was taken as regards her.’112 The fact that specific legislation on the issue was even considered, 
and that no action was taken against the 1949 ‘juryman’ because he was in fact ‘a very kindly 
and respectable old lady’ suggests a developing sense that, despite the relatively low numbers 
involved, a way had to be found to stop jurors bringing their verdicts into disrepute. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the general feeling that disclosure of 
deliberations should be avoided, and should not be taken into account in appeals, shifted to a 
specific argument that steps were needed to positively prevent disclosure. In 1951, the Lord 
Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice agreed that notices should be displayed in all jury rooms 
affirming the need to keep deliberations secret.113 Eight years later, it was decided that any 
                                                 
109 A Home Office minute dated 20 Dec 1911 states ‘I have seen the LCJ. He is firmly convinced of Lightfoot’s 
guilt’ (National Archives: HO 144/1122/204340/31). 
110 Home Office, above n 29, p408 (original file destroyed). 
111 Ibid, p 408. 
112 Ibid, p 408; original file (National Archives: HO 45/23964) closed until 2025. 
113 Ibid, p 386 (original file destroyed). 
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future departmental committee on juries should explore ways of keeping deliberations secret;114 
and in 1966 the Lord Chief Justice, in a letter to the Home Office, recommended the creation 
of a criminal sanction for juror disclosure.115 The Home Office resisted this proposal (also 
made by Lord Brooke in the Lords debates on the Criminal Justice Bill of that year),116 on the 
ground that it needed more thought. ‘The possibility of a specific sanction for a breach of 
secrecy by a juror does not seem to have been fully examined on Home Office files’;117 so the 
Home Office sent the proposal to the Criminal Law Revision Committee for their full 
consideration.118 In 1981, it finally became contempt to disclose or solicit the specifics of a 
jury’s deliberations, following Lord Widgery CJ’s ruling in the Divisional Court that, despite 
several recent examples of juror disclosures, such disclosures would only amount to contempt 
at common law if they actually interfered with the administration of justice.119 
Contempt has, for the past thirty years, been the most visible tool for disciplining errant jurors. 
But while punishment in this context is related to jurors’ verdicts, legal reform on this matter 
was not justified by reference to a desire to punish jurors for acquitting in the face of what the 
judge considered overwhelming evidence. In this way, the sort of juror punishment undermined 
by the decision in Bushell’s Case seems (with the notable exception of Lathan’s informal 
punishment) an unusual response to misconduct. Far from punishing jurors for failing to apply 
                                                 
114 Ibid, p 386. 
115 Lord Parker was specifically concerned about a recent case in which The Daily Mail had attempted to secure 
an interview with a person who had recently served as a juror at the Old Bailey, and he wondered whether ‘it 
might be better to make it an offence for anyone to approach a juror not only during a trial but after a trial with a 
view to obtaining information’. Letter from Lord Parker of Waddington to Philip Allen, 1 Nov 1966 (National 
Archives: HO 291/1482). 
116 HL Deb 6 Jun 1967, vol 283, cols 365-366. 
117 ‘Note on the Lord Chief Justice’s Letter of 1st November 1966’ (National Archives: HO 291/1482) p 3. 
118 This ‘delighted’ the Lord Chief Justice: Letter from Lord Parker of Waddington to Philip Allen, 31 Jul 1967 
(National Archives: HO 291/1482). The Committee, in a report which closely mirrored the earlier discussion 
within the Home Office, recommended no changes to the law: Criminal Law Revision Committee, Secrecy of 
Jury Room (CLRC No 10, 1968) para 4. 
119 A-G v New Statesman and Nation Publishing [1981] QB 1; Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 8. 
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law to fact correctly, judges have been empowered since 1981 to imprison jurors for giving 
any information about this matter: it is not an offence to deliver an inaccurate verdict, but it is 
an offence to tell anyone you were part of a jury which did so. Clearly, as Lathan’s punishment 
shows, as late as 1917 it was still possible (although ill-advised when faced with a juror seised 
of his or her rights) for a judge to punish a juror for a purely judicial offence. But in order for 
jury verdicts to remain above reproach it was considered necessary to create what amounted to 
a new ministerial offence. 
3. Quasi-‘ministerial’ offences 
In Bushell’s Case, Vaughan CJ failed to fully define his ‘ministerial’ offences, only giving a 
series of examples such as refusing to give a verdict or not withdrawing after a valid challenge. 
This leaves embracery in an ambiguous position. Should it be considered ‘judicial’, as 
misconduct directly impacting upon a verdict’s bona fides? Or should it be considered 
‘ministerial’, despite not falling squarely within any of the examples given by Vaughan? The 
OED defines the relevant sense of ‘ministerial’ as ‘designating an action which is a necessary 
part of a person’s official duty … so that the agent is not responsible for its ethicality or 
consequences’;120 and it would appear therefore to include any part of the juror’s task other 
than the conscientious problem of reaching a verdict. Despite Bushell’s Case having been 
attacked by several historians for the anachronistic argument that a jury might rely on its 
independent knowledge,121 Vaughan did include receiving evidence out of court after being 
                                                 
120 This is listed as a specific meaning under definition 1b. When, in 1879, the Criminal Code Bill Commission 
published its Draft Code – ‘Draft Code’ in Criminal Code Bill Commission, Report (C (2nd Series) 2345, 1879) – 
jury offences were contained neither within the category of judicial corruption (s 111) nor within the category of 
ministerial corruption (s 112); rather, s 129 provided for an offence of ‘corruptly influencing juries and witnesses’, 
and thereby put the juror in a special category, being neither judicial nor ministerial in nature. 
121 See in particular Langbein, above n 22, p 324 n 346 and Stern, above n 17, 1816; although see Whitman, above 
n 41, pp 177-178 arguing that if the argument was truly anachronistic it could not possibly have been as well-
received as it was at the time. 
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sworn in in his set of ministerial offences. To the extent that embracery involved an attempt at 
influencing a jury’s verdict after the jury had been sworn in, embracery must therefore fall at 
least within the spirit of Vaughan’s ministerial offences. 
Embracery, then, should be considered a quasi-ministerial offence, and its ambiguity within 
the classification of juror offences proposed in Bushell’s Case also extends to the fact it was 
not only jurors who could be proceeded against for the offence. Both the jurors themselves and 
the people who had attempted to influence their verdicts (a feature of embracery which makes 
the offence also quasi-judicial in nature) could be prosecuted for the offence. Nonetheless, 
prosecutions were uncommon enough that even trials at the Old Bailey failed on procedural 
grounds. In January 1891, for example, one James Baker was indicted for embracery and 
perverting the course of justice, having attempted ‘to incline the … jury to be more favourable 
… by persuasions, entertainments, and other unlawful means’.122 Baker’s counsel successfully 
argued the indictment was faulty, as embracery must relate to specific jurors rather than to ‘a 
jury’ generally.123 This only delayed matters, however, as in March he was indicted again; and 
this time the indictment named the jurors.124 They were examined at trial, and Baker was 
convicted; but it should be noted that, despite the impropriety of the jurors’ actions in Baker’s 
case,125 there was no suggestion that they should also be indicted. 
A year after James Baker’s successful second trial for embracery at the Old Bailey, one James 
Asplin was called upon to serve as a juror in a murder trial at the Northampton Assizes. During 
                                                 
122 James Baker, above n 48. 
123 This argument was based on 32 Hen VIII c 9, s 3; unspecified parts of Blackstone’s Commentaries, Stephen’s 
Digest and Hawkins’ Pleas of the Crown; and ‘Draft Code’ in Criminal Code Bill Commission, Report (C (2nd 
Series) 2345, 1879) s 129. Although the prosecution argued unsuccessfully that R v Fuller (1797) 168 ER 495 
established that these details were not necessary. 
124 James Baker, above n 48. 
125 Baker had taken several jurors out for drinks. It should, however, be noted that one of the jurors expressed 
regret at having met with the defendant: ‘I had never heard of embracery before; I did not know I was embraced, 
and I am very sorry I was’. Ibid. 
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an adjournment, Asplin left the court in order to post a letter. The trial judge considered this ‘a 
gross contempt of Court’, which had exposed the whole jury to the danger of external 
‘influence’.126 He fined Asplin £50 and discharged the jury.127 Asplin was not prosecuted for 
embracery, but was instead convicted of contempt for exposing the jury to the risk of 
embracery.128 The judge’s reaction suggests he considered interference to be a danger to be 
protected against, and this is a danger which continued into the early decades of the twentieth 
century. But the onus generally seems to have been on embracers not to embrace, rather than 
on jurors not to be embraced, and there is no record of a juror being proceeded against for 
embracery during the period covered by this article until 1934. Asplin’s contempt conviction 
was an unusual judicial response. 
Even where there was clear evidence of embracery, the official response was more likely to be 
an increase in security than prosecutions.129 In 1910, two Chief Constables reported several 
recent instances of embracery. The Chief Constable of St Helens described a 1904 trial at 
Margate, where several jurors came back from adjournment drunk and hostile towards the 
prosecution. The trial judge gave a ‘very lucid and strong summing up’,130 and a conviction 
                                                 
126 ‘The Assizes: Midland circuit, the Althorp murder’ The Times (19 Nov 1892); see generally the Home Office 
file on McRae’s trial (National Archives: HO 144/246/A54448B). 
127 Ibid; see generally the Home Office file on McRae’s trial (National Archives: HO 144/246/A54448B). Jurors, 
prior to 1897, were not usually permitted to separate during a trial. As Howlin has demonstrated, however, from 
the late eighteenth century this rule started, in practice, to be interpreted liberally by the judiciaries both of England 
and of Ireland: Howlin, above n 21, 733-735. 
128 Eady and Smith, discussing two similar cases where jurors were not punished (R v Ward (1867) 17 (NS) LT 
220 and R v Ketteridge [1915] 1 KB 467 (CA), concluded ‘there can be little doubt that such conduct would at 
least be capable of constituting the actus reus of contempt’: Eady and Smith, above n 24, p 852. See also (National 
Archives: HO 45/13321/93), where in 1926 two female jurors were discharged after admitting to having spoken 
to the plaintiff. As Howlin has observed, from the eighteenth century onwards the general rule against jurors 
separating tended to be relaxed, and on both sides of the Irish Sea there was developed ‘a more humane approach 
toward the confinement of jurors, evident from the early nineteenth century’. Howlin, above n 21, 735. 
129 Howlin has explored the problem of embracery in nineteenth-century Ireland, and has concluded that ‘[m]ore 
often, the juror would be fined’. Ibid, 723. This is quite different to the apparent practice in England, and could 
be explained by the widespread nature of the threats and intimidation often faced by nineteenth-century Irish 
jurors. 
130 Letter from AR Ellerington to Thomas W Byrne, 28 Jul 1910 (National Archives: HO 45/10622/196419). 
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was secured despite the protest of several jurors, ‘whom I afterwards learnt were accused by 
the other jurymen of having been bribed by the friends of the prisoners’.131 Accrington’s Chief 
Constable reported that a ‘tout for solicitors’132 and former publican had accurately predicted 
when several juries would fail to reach a verdict, and that it was ‘a common occurrence to hear 
jurymen discussing cases … with the public at luncheon in the hotels near to the Courts at 
Manchester, Liverpool and Preston’.133 When a judge ordered a jury subject to one such 
prediction to stay in court, ‘the jurymen were only five minutes in giving their verdict’.134 The 
Chief Constables did not, however, indicate any desire on their part to proceed against such 
jurors. Reports from local newspapers also confirm the impression that jurors tended not to be 
punished for embracery, with the most likely consequence being either a stern rebuke or a 
discharge. Judges might, however, occasionally put jurors ‘on their guard against the attempt 
of any person to try to reason, cajole, or even bribe them’.135 As we have already seen above, 
jurors did occasionally discuss their cases outside court, but judges do not seem to have been 
keen to punish such jurors, with one such judge simply noting that ‘I don’t know which member 
of the jury was responsible and it is not for me to find out, but I am deeply disturbed’.136 
Embracery was an issue, then, but it was not one which was generally responded to with juror 
punishment. This echoes the more recent reported cases of trials on indictment for perverting 
                                                 
131 Ibid. Ellerington suggested that this was quite a common occurrence. 
132 Letter from George Sinclair to Thomas W Byrne, 2 Aug 1910 (National Archives: HO 45/10622/196419). 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 ‘Hooley Trial: Judge’s rebuke at the Old Bailey’ Western Times (10 Feb 1912). 
136 ‘Rebuke for Juryman: New Trial Ordered’ Derby Daily Telegraph (28 Nov 1947). See also ‘Juror Rebuked: 
Told to go away from Old Bailey’ Hull Daily Mail (6 May 1932). 
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the course of justice by interfering with a juror: while those doing the perverting have been 
prosecuted, the affected jurors seem generally to have simply been discharged.137 
Following the reports of Accrington’s and St Helens’ Chief Constables, the Lord Chief Justice 
agreed that trial judges should be reminded that they did not have to let jurors separate (thereby 
exposing them to the danger of embracery): that the Juries Detention Act 1897 actually gave 
them discretion on this issue.138 During the following few decades there was growing pressure 
to alter the law, and again this pressure consisted not of calls for more rigorous enforcement of 
the law concerning juror misconduct but, rather, consisted of calls for a stricter management of 
the space occupied by the jurors. Misconduct was to be managed away, but not prosecuted. In 
1928, for example, when the Home Office considered extending the 1897 Act so as to allow 
the jurors to separate even when trying ‘murder, treason and treason-felony’, it was noted that 
the ‘[g]eneral view of the judges was against alteration of the law’.139 In 1948, the law was 
finally altered so as to allow for separation in all cases.140 What is notable in all this is that 
embracery was viewed as a problem to be managed, rather than as a criminal offence to be 
prosecuted. Juror punishment for embracery was technically possible, but practically speaking 
it seems rarely to have been used.  
There is, however, some limited evidence of jurors having been punished for embracery. A 
Home Office precedent book reports in 1934 a ‘Jury foreman convicted of embracery 
                                                 
137 R v Bowen [1996] 1 Cr App R (S) 63; R v Mitchell-Crinkley [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 368 (jury discharged); R v 
Hardy [2004] EWCA Crim 3397, [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 48 (jury discharged); R v Cameron [2008] EWCA Crim 
2493. 
138 Letter from Lord Alverstone to Winston Churchill, 17 Oct 1910 (National Archives: HO 45/10622/196419/2). 
The power to permit jurors to separate at all can be contrasted to the famous image of the medieval jury being 
carried about on the back of a cart, unable to separate until they had reached a verdict: discussed in, e.g., 
Duncombe, above n 34, p 218 (EEBO image 109502:122). 
139 Home Office, above n 29, p385 (original file destroyed). 
140 Criminal Justice Act 1948, s 35(4). See also Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s43. 
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(accepting bribe to influence jury)’,141 and contemporaneous newspaper reports offer a fuller 
account of what had happened. Three men had been on trial at the Old Bailey for conspiring to 
defraud their creditors, and obtaining goods by deception, when they found that the foreman 
of their jury was also their accountant, Walter Ramsey. The four men met over dinner, and 
Ramsey offered them a verdict for £50. After a brief period of haggling, they eventually agreed 
on an acceptable price. When the scheme was discovered, Ramsey and one of the three 
defendants, a Mr Kreditor, ‘were charged with conspiring together to obtain a false verdict ... 
and Ramsey was further charged with being a juryman empanelled at the Old Bailey, [who] 
accepted a bribe of £7 10s.’142 Prosecuting counsel noted that ‘the charge against Ramsey ... 
was, if true, the offence of embracery’,143 and went on to explain that ‘[a] prosecution of this 
kind has not taken place for many years’.144 The Recorder held at the end of the trial that there 
was insufficient evidence for the conspiracy charge, but left the jury to reach a verdict on the 
question of the bribery. When the jury convicted Ramsey, the Recorder noted that ‘It is very 
difficult to bring such matters as these to justice, and I have very grave doubt if it is not my 
duty to pass upon you a maximum sentence ... However, you will go to prison for 18 months’.145 
In another undated case (probably no later than 1963),146 a prosecutor ‘refused permission to 
bring a criminal action of “Embracery” against the foreman of the jury at his trial’.147 A 1963 
file containing correspondence between the Home Office and the Lord Chief Justice (which 
has not survived) also contained a ‘note of other reported cases of misconduct involving jury 
                                                 
141 Home Office, above n 29, p 385. 
142 ‘Jury Foreman in Dock: Side by side with man he tried’ Western Daily Press (25 Jul 1933). 
143 ‘Foreman of Jury who took Bribe: First case for many years’ Gloucester Citizen (25 Jul 1933). 
144 ‘Jury Foreman in Dock’, above n 142. 
145 Ibid. 
146 The internal reference given in the precedent book shows it was bundled together with the 1963 file referred 
to below. 
147 Home Office, above n 29, p 385. 
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men.’148 The fact two of these records either define embracery or put it in inverted commas 
suggests the crime was not one which officials were used to dealing with as a criminal offence. 
This makes the 1934 conviction of the foreman particularly important: what was so unusual 
about this case which meant a conviction was sought? There are two probable factors. First, 
the evidence here pointed to a clear link between the embracer and the embracee, in a way 
which must have been generally difficult to establish beyond reasonable doubt (and the 
Recorder explicitly alluded to this factor). Second, the fact Ramsey had instigated the offence 
by proposing a price of £50 clearly made this case more egregious than a previously innocent 
juror having been approached in a pub. Both of these factors must make Ramsey’s 
imprisonment genuinely unusual. 
It is well known that the creation of majority verdicts in 1967 was largely motivated by police 
concerns about the problem of corrupted jurors.149 Sanders, Young and Burton have argued 
that ‘a more appropriate response’ would have been ‘effective protection for … jurors.’150 In 
fact, the cost of such protection was one of the police’s chief concerns. A note written on a 
December 1966 Home Office document asks ‘why are there so few prosecutions for embracery 
if there is so much of it’;151 and representatives of the Metropolitan Police were accordingly 
asked for their reply. Two contemporaneous prosecutions were identified during the Home 
Office’s enquiries, as well as three cases where the Director of Public Prosecutions had decided 
                                                 
148 Ibid, p 385. 
149 Sean Enright and James Morton, Taking Liberties: the criminal jury in the 1990s (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1990) pp 69-76. Although as late as 1954 the Metropolitan Police described its own decision to have 
twelve police officers ‘engaged on observation of jurymen’ in a retrial, after the first trial collapsed due to jury 
tampering, as ‘extreme measures’ (National Archives: MEPO 2/9632). 
150Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal Justice (4th edn, OUP 2010) p 570. 
151 Note on Letter from AJE Brennan to JA Chilcot, 20 Dec 1966 (National Archives: HO 291/1480). Questions 
to this effect were also being asked by the press and in Parliament at this time: discussed in Letter from DEJ 
Dowler to AJE Brennan, 28 Dec 1966 (National Archives: HO 291/1480). 
36 
 
there was insufficient evidence for a prosecution.152 The police were, however, very concerned 
about the existing cost of protecting jurors from corruption: ‘I think you already know that it 
takes the services of 72 police officers during each period of 24 hours to look after one team 
of jurymen’.153 The choice, as far as the Metropolitan Police were concerned, seems to have 
been between preventing embracery at great expense, or ensuring a couple of bribed jurors 
could simply (and cheaply) be outvoted. 
Embracery, of course, tainted a verdict’s reliability; but it was difficult for a verdict so tainted 
to be dealt with adequately. Today, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provides that a jury may be 
discharged if it has been tampered with,154 and that in certain circumstances the danger of 
tampering can result in a new trial before a judge sitting without a jury.155 If tampering is not 
discovered until after an acquittal, it is also possible that the defendant might be retried in 
certain circumstances.156 This technical limitation on double jeopardy157 is, however, still 
relatively new. When the Home Office were considering how to respond to police fears 
regarding embracery in 1966, one suggestion was that double jeopardy should be specifically 
relaxed in this way for those found guilty of the offence.158 The response this proposal received 
emphasises how rarely embracery was actually prosecuted: 
                                                 
152 Letter from AJE Brennan to DEJ Dowler, 10 Jan 1967 (National Archives: HO 291/1480). The Home Office’s 
request for information had also acknowledged it was usually ‘impossible to get the evidence to support 
prosecutions’: Letter from AJE Brennan to PE Brodie, 29 Dec 1966 (National Archives: HO 291/1480). 
153 Letter from PE Brodie to AJE Brennan, 2 Jan1967 (National Archives: HO 291/1480). 
154 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 46. 
155 Ibid, s 44. 
156 Ie where the requirements of ibid, ss 76-80 are met; and if the acquitted person had been originally tried for 
one of the offences listed in ibid, sch 5. 
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‘Finality in Criminal Justice: when should the CPS reopen a case?’ [2012] Crim LR 526; and I Dennis, ‘Quashing 
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‘In general it is so difficult to get evidence of embracery, particularly of successful 
attempts, that the proposed … provision could be invoked extremely rarely. Its practical 
value, if any, in preventing the occasional criminal from getting away with corruption 
could hardly compensate for the trouble it could be expected to cause during the passage 
of the Bill.’159  
Despite the active discussion between Home Office and Metropolitan Police officials in the 
1960s regarding embracery, by the 1970s the Court of Appeal had for all practical purposes 
abolished the offence,160 and in 2010 this abolition was formalised.161 But even when 
government still considered embracery an extant common law offence, there was little 
indication that it was likely to be regularly used as a way of punishing errant jurors. 
Owing to the ambivalence inherent in Vaughan’s explanation of the judicial-ministerial 
distinction as regards juror punishment, it is difficult to precisely identify embracery either as 
a judicial or as a ministerial offence. A juror guilty of embracery, it could be said, has 
committed a ministerial offence in the same way as the Pennsylvania jurors who cast lots rather 
than deliberate: she has acted in a way which undermines the jurors’ ability to act judicially. 
Any punishment meted out to such a juror will therefore refer to this failure in the non-
discretionary, ministerial, part of the juror’s task, rather than the truly judicial task of honest 
deliberation. It is, nonetheless, clear that this kind of quasi-ministerial offence has very rarely 
resulted in jurors being tried and punished. This is so despite the fact that a juror being 
successfully embraced was no less a crime than a defendant attempting to embrace. Indeed, on 
several occasions juror punishment following embracery was seriously considered; and in 1933 
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a foreman was convicted for being embraced. But despite the decision in 1825 to preserve the 
offence, embracery seems in general to have been considered a problem to be managed rather 
than an offence to be prosecuted. 
4. ‘Ministerial’ offences 
There is little evidence of jurors in nineteenth- and twentieth-century England having been 
punished for judicial or quasi-ministerial offences. Even when jurors were punished for 
activities relating to a verdict, it was the act of publicising a verdict’s flaws, rather than the fact 
the flaws existed, which was most likely to have been the problem. As it was in 1670, so too 
in 1870 or 1970: jurors could only be punished for ministerial offences. But ministerial offences 
have not only concerned the relatively dramatic problem of a juror disavowing her own verdict; 
they have also concerned lesser matters such as a juror failing to attend because she never 
received her summons, or a juror leaving court in order to post a letter. Given that a rather large 
number of people called to serve must have acted in ways which might fall into this fairly broad 
category of ministerial offences, it will be important to try to understand who was and was not 
punished, and why. In this way, Vaughan’s bare conceptual dichotomy of judicial and 
ministerial offences can be fleshed out with practical details. And by fleshing out the concepts, 
we might proceed a step or two closer to understanding the practices of juror punishment. 
Giles Duncombe ended his 1665 Tryalls per Pais with a discussion of juror misconduct, 
separated roughly into a first half on ministerial offences and a second half on judicial 
offences.162 Duncombe lists the following as those things which a jury, acting in its ministerial 
capacity, must not do: eating and drinking after being sworn (except with the assent of the 
parties); receiving evidence (particularly from the parties) after the trial has ended; and leaving 
                                                 
162 Duncombe, unlike Vaughan in Bushell’s Case, does not use this language. 
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court after having been sworn. Duncombe’s focus here was on the circumstances which could 
void a verdict, rather than those for which jurors might be punished, but he did specifically 
state that ‘If the Jury after their Evidence given unto them at the Barre, do at their own Charges 
eat or drink ... it is finable, but it shall not avoid the Verdict.’163 This suggests that the other 
ministerial offences, which could void verdicts, also carried for those jurors guilty of them the 
threat of a fine. Howlin has identified a number of nineteenth-century cases in which jurors 
were rebuked for having acquired refreshments, but in none of these cases were the jurors 
actually fined,164 and by 1870 the rule was formally abolished in England.165 
The most common kind of ministerial offence in the period under discussion was a failure to 
respond to jury summonses, or a failure to attend on time. While there is evidence that it was 
considered acceptable to punish non-attending jurors in some circumstances, the picture was 
still reasonably equivocal. When, in 1866, the Treasury Solicitor was asked when he would 
exercise his discretion to remit such fines, he explained he would only do so extraordinarily.166 
This was still the case almost a century later when, in 1952, the Treasury Solicitor ruled that a 
soldier stationed in Germany and a man who had not received his summons on account of 
having moved house each had sufficiently exceptional excuses for their fines to be waived.167 
One particularly clear example of Treasury ruthlessness is the 1861 decision that jurors 
ineligible due to old age should still be fined for not attending, as it was their own fault if they 
                                                 
163 Duncombe, above n 34, p 212 (EEBO image 109502:119). 
164 Howlin, above n 21, 735-739. 
165 Juries Act 1870, s 23. 
166 Case as to the Remission of Jury Fines, 23 Mar 1866 (National Archives: TS 25/1468). It is, of course, perfectly 
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167 R v Humphreys; R v Burton, Sep-Oct 1952 (National Archives: T 221/145). See also Letter from RS Meiklejohn 
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had not removed themselves from the register.168 These rulings give little sense of how 
frequently fines were remitted by forgiving trial judges, however, and so should be treated with 
caution. So the next question we must ask is how trial judges treated jurors guilty of ministerial 
offences: did such jurors, in practice, tend to be punished?  
Local newspapers occasionally reported on late or absent jurors and, while the evidence of a 
handful of instances cannot be used in order to establish any sort of clear trend, it does appear 
that the consequences for such jurors became steadily less serious. One early report (from 1830) 
describes a juror being fined £100 for leaving court in search of a snack, and thereby missing 
his jury’s deliberations and verdict. ‘The Court said the case was unprecedented’,169 and we 
should therefore avoid drawing too strong a conclusion from the response to this particular 
juror’s misconduct. Forty years later, a Manchester juror who was thirty minutes late returning 
from lunch was fined £5, a penalty probably more closely connected to his ‘not offering any 
excuse’ than to the inconvenience he caused.170 In 1880, Field J announced he would fine 
Staffordshire special jurors £10 for each day of court they missed;171 but a decade later two 
common jurors were only fined 40s for failing to attend Coventry Quarter Sessions.172 During 
the early twentieth century, there are several further reports of jurors being rebuked for being 
late or absent,173 but fines appear to have been less common. This does not, of course, mean 
that the threat of fines stopped being part of a trial judge’s managerial arsenal, however, as two 
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Devon jurors learned when they received the following caution in 1934: ‘The administration 
of justice cannot go on if jurymen and jurywomen forget their summonses ... I could fine you 
heavily, but I do not propose to do so this time.’174 People who lacked a good reason for 
attending on time could still, well into the last century, be subjected at least to the threat of 
punishment for their ministerial failings.175 
Government records are less clear when it comes to those with a legal exemption from jury 
service, however. As late as 1930, the Treasury had to be asked whether an undischarged 
bankrupt could be imprisoned in lieu of a fine for non-attendance;176 and during the nineteenth 
century the liability of diplomats was also unclear (or at least variable).  In 1854, when a 
member of Dutch consular staff contacted the Foreign Office in order to object to being 
threatened with a fine and imprisonment for non-attendance on a City of London jury,177 the 
Foreign Secretary came to the Dutch official’s aid, reminding the Lord Mayor’s Office of 
statutory provisions making it an offence to threaten foreign diplomats with imprisonment.178 
Thirty years later, when a Belgian official politely asked whether he should have been 
‘amerced’ (ie fined) for non-attendance,179 the Home Office simply noted statutory provisions 
which did not include foreign diplomats in their list of excusable persons.180 This problem 
                                                 
174 ‘Late Jurors: Rebuked by Recorder at Devon Quarter Sessions’ Western Morning News (6 Apr 1934). 
175 As Howlin has demonstrated, nineteenth-century Irish jurors were very frequently fined large sums for non-
attendance: Howlin, above n 21, 723-728. This, however, must be understood as part of the very different 
pressures facing jurors in this context. 
176 While the Treasury ultimately concluded that he could lawfully be imprisoned for non-payment of his fine, it 
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177 Letter from Baron Bentick to the Earl of Clarendon, 5 Jan 1854 (National Archives: HO 45/5732). 
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c 12, s 4. 
179 Letter from John W Foster to William Vernon Harcourt, 29 Apr 1885 (National Archives: HO 
45/9653/A39468). 
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would eventually be resolved when, in the early 1920s, legislation was passed restricting the 
jury franchise to propertied voters (and therefore Englishmen);181 but the variable treatment of 
these Dutch and Belgian jurors in the nineteenth century hints at the possibility of a wider lack 
of principle in governmental approaches to juror punishment. 
Women of the mid-twentieth century were, to borrow from TH Marshall, another class of 
potential jurors with a ‘peculiar’ legal status.182 Their liability to serve, and therefore their 
exposure to punishment, was complex. They were completely ineligible for jury service until 
1920183 and, as Logan has shown, there was over the following half-century a concerted effort 
among lawyers and judges to take advantage of rules enabling the exclusion of women from 
jury service.184 The question of the punishment of women who chose not to serve still merits 
attention, however. In 1921, a Newquay woman was fined £5 for non-attendance;185 although 
the preponderance of the evidence suggests women were generally permitted to excuse 
themselves. One judge, writing extra-judicially in 1921, claimed no jurors had been fined for 
non-attendance at London’s High Court for many years, and that with a little tact judges could 
protect the sensibilities of the ‘Victorian woman who has all her life protested against 
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enfranchisement’.186 But in a 1928 trial where all three female jurors had asked to be excused, 
the Recorder characterised their request as ‘very deplorable’ and contrary to their ‘duty as 
citizens’.187 They were excused, however, and were subjected neither to fines nor to 
imprisonment. 
The Newquay woman fined in 1921 for non-attendance had apparently explained that she ‘was 
not in agreement with the change in the law’,188 but this is the only evidence I have been able 
to find of punishment for ministerial offences motivated by conscience. The following year, a 
woman called to serve on a London grand jury claimed she would ‘not guilty’ everyone if she 
was forced to serve; and the Lord Mayor, having attempted to persuade her that ‘it would be 
an experience for you’,189 eventually relented. In 1923, the suffragists Eva Gore-Booth and 
Esther Roper refused to serve due to conscientious objections to participating in criminal 
punishment; and while their decision was attacked in the press, there is no evidence that they 
were formally punished.190 But judicial resistance to punishing these jurors was not only a 
reflection of unease about having female jurors: a Home Office book reports in 1928 a 
‘Juryman with “conscientious obj” to serving who threatens to disagree with verdict of others 
whatever it might be. Told that such action would be a criminal offence’.191 Contemporaneous 
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press reports reveal that he was not actually punished due to his name not being selected,192 
however, making it impossible to tell whether this was simply a rhetorical threat, or whether 
the trial judge intended to follow it through. Either way, it is clear that the threat of fines for 
ministerial offences was still considered legitimate.  
So how frequently were jurors punished for the straightforward ministerial offences of failing 
to attend court, or of refusing to serve? The first thing to note is that those cases which are 
preserved at the National Archives or were reported by the press are by definition unusual: if 
they were ordinary, uncontroversial cases, they would presumably have been resolved locally. 
It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that more jurors must have been fined for non-
attendance than those which survive in governmental records. This, in itself, suggests that 
punishment was considered acceptable for ordinary ministerial offences. There is, on the other 
hand, the claim of the early twentieth-century judge that London judges treated non-attendance 
pragmatically, in practice letting absentee jurors off without penalty, while simultaneously 
taking care to avoid advertising this fact. The evidence of local newspapers suggests that 
provincial courts took a similar approach, certainly by the early twentieth century. What we do 
know is that the practice of punishing jurors for ministerial offences was considered a 
legitimate way of governing jurors. At no point did the Treasury resolve that jurors should not 
be fined: they always restricted themselves to the question whether this fine, in these 
circumstances, should be remitted. Punishment for ministerial offences, then, operated as a 
normal part of jury management. 
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Conclusions 
The provisions of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which create indictable offences 
of misconduct by a criminal trial juror are probably unprecedented in the modern history of 
English law. By moving away from contempt and into jury trial for quasi-judicial misconduct, 
the new provisions draw a sharp line between juror punishment pre- and post-2015. It is, 
however, possible to piece together a picture of how juror punishment has operated in the recent 
past; and it is important that this is in fact done, in order to gain a greater sense of the 
significance of the new offences. What has emerged here, in pulling together archival evidence, 
is a general resistance to the idea of juror punishment where jurors have acted in their judicial, 
rather than in their ministerial, capacity. But in practice the judicial-ministerial divide has acted 
more like a continuum than a hard distinction: the closer you are to the judicial end of the 
spectrum, the less likely it has been that a juror will be punished; and offences closer to being 
straightforwardly ministerial have been much more likely to result in punishment. Even here, 
however, there appears to have been a significant degree of prosecutorial discretion. 
Even in the wholly ministerial category of offences, there is a lack of clarity about when jurors 
were and were not proceeded against. This is, to some extent, a consequence of the fragmentary 
nature of the surviving records: because juror punishment has not previously been considered 
a particularly important or controversial topic, files have not been bundled together, and many 
of the original records referred to in Home Office records have been destroyed. Ministerial 
offences only appear to have entered the cognisance of central government either when those 
punished have contacted the Treasury to ask to have their fines remitted, or when the 
circumstances were sufficiently noteworthy that newspaper cuttings were collected on the 
issue. While it would have been possible to explore how juror punishment was approached at 
individual Quarter Sessions and Assize Courts, this would have resulted in a fragmentary 
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analysis, with much less relevance to understanding the centralised reforms being pursued 
today. The surviving evidence at the National Archives and in the British Newspaper Archive 
demonstrates that punishment for ministerial offences was generally dealt with as a routine part 
of jury management. Juror punishment was much less problematic in straightforwardly 
ministerial circumstances than it was in the more contentious class of judicial offences. 
There is limited evidence of jurors being punished for judicial offences; and even where jurors 
were punished for non-ministerial offences the problem remains of teasing out the factors 
which made punishment more or less likely. The quasi-imprisonment of Lathan and his co-
jurors can probably be considered exceptional; but the picture is much less clear when 
considering quasi-ministerial offences such as embracery. Most of the time, the police, the 
government and the judiciary seem to have been more willing to develop strategies for 
managing away the problem. But sometimes the person attempting to influence the jury was 
prosecuted; and very occasionally a juror was also punished for being embraced. One reason 
for the scarcity of prosecutions for embracery was probably a lack of evidence. As the Home 
Office official put it in 1966, rejecting proposals to abolish double jeopardy for convicted 
embracers, the limited advantage of being able to retry such people ‘could hardly compensate 
for the trouble it could be expected to cause during the passage of the Bill’. 
The new offences are only likely to be prosecuted rarely, where jurors have, for example, left 
printed evidence of their misconduct in the jury room after their deliberations have ended. What 
this article has demonstrated is that judges have traditionally been very cautious about formally 
proceeding against jurors suspected of misconduct touching upon their judicial function. Even 
in cases of embracery and perverting the course of justice, which were tried on indictment and 
were therefore not subject to the same level of judicial control as were summary contempt 
cases, there appears to have been a general reluctance to institute proceedings against jurors, 
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as opposed to the people accused of embracing or perverting them. The nineteenth-century 
debates about whether the press or the judiciary were better placed to rebuke jurors felt to have 
exercised their judgment improperly hint at a possible explanation: that the strictly judicial 
aspect of the judge-jury relationship is ultimately rooted in an idea of the judge as tutor, rather 
than as disciplinarian. Despite the new statutory offences’ stated aim of sending out a clear 
message that juror misconduct is wrong, and will be dealt with seriously, this means juror 
misconduct will probably be dealt with in most cases through practices designed to manage 
away the problem, as was seen for example in the discussion of embracery above; and of course 
ministerial offences will still be dealt with summarily. Juror punishment can, therefore, be 
expected to carry on in much the same way as it did throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. And if this is so then the future of juror misconduct is unlikely to be radically 
different from its recent past. 
